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AVIATION REGULATION: A TIME FOR CHANGE
JOHN W. SNOW*

R

EFORM of the commercial aviation economic regulatory system is one of the most important and controversial questions
facing the aviation community today. It would not be an exaggeration to say that we are at a watershed for aviation regulation. Extensive hearings on the issue were conducted by the Subcommittee
on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary
Committee.! The Subcommittee has released its draft report which
is a ringing criticism and indictment of the present regulatory system. The final report is expected soon. The Civil Aeronautics
Board's special staff report on regulatory reform was recently completed.! It concluded that "protective entry control, exit control
and public utility-type price regulation under the Federal Aviation
Act are not justified by the underlying cost and demand characteristics of commercial air transportation. ' The staff report recommends substantial relaxation of present controls on entry and pricing. The Administration has submitted major legislation to overhaul the present system of airline regulation." Hearings on this legislation are expected to occupy a considerable amount of Congressional attention in the next few months. The present system of
airline regulation is the product of a different era. While the needs
and conditions on which airline regulation was first predicated
*Deputy

Under Secretary, Department of Transportation.

1 Hearing on the Oversight of Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and Proced-

ures Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy Hearings].
I CAB, REGULATORY REFORM: REPORT OF THE C.A.B. SPECIAL STAFF (1975).
3 Id., Executive Summary at 1.
'S. 2551, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 10261, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (hereinafter
cited as the Aviation Act of 1975). See also, Aviation Act of 1975, Message from
the President of the United States Transmitting a Draft of Proposed Legislation,
H.R. Doc. No. 94-278, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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nearly forty years ago have changed substantially, the goals, practices, and underlying approach of government regulation have not.
In 1938, when the Civil Aeronautics Act was passed, government assistance, through protection, subsidy, promotion, and economic regulation was regarded as necessary to nourish and foster
the growth of an infant industry. In the intervening period, the
airline industry has become a mature and important part of the nation's economy. Today it is the dominant mode of public transportation for intercity passengers.
Unfortunately, the regulatory system has not kept pace with the
underlying technological change and economic growth in the industry. Former problems, such as public acceptance of air transport, have been largely solved. Today the major problems facing
the industry are a product of regulatory practices which are badly
out of date and do not advance the publilc interest in an efficient
airline industry responsive to the public needs. Regulation now
protects established firms from the forces of healthy competition.
The present system of airline regulation is seriously deficient. It
results in a serious misallocation of resources; it causes air fares to
be considerably higher than they would be otherwise; it discourages service innovations; it denies consumers the range of price and
service options which they would prefer; and it creates a chronic
tendency towards excess capacity in the industry.! On review of
the evidence one is forced to conclude that the present regulatory
system is hindering, not advancing, the original statutory objectives
of "adequate, economical and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges."' The present regulatory system has become a
major obstacle in providing air service "at the lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of such service."'
These defects result from the policies the CAB has adopted with
respect to entry and pricing. They flow naturally from the artificial suppression of competitive market forces. The deficiencies
can only be corrected by modification of the present regulatory
5 J.
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TRANSPORT: THEORY AND POLICY, Chs. 4, 5 (1974); W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA: EFFECTS AND IMPERFECTIONS, Ch. 3 (1970); J. MILLER, PERPOLICY, Part 2 (1975).
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102(c), 49 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (1970).

SPECTIVES ON FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION

749 U.S.C. § 1482(e)(2) (1970).
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system to allow wider operation of competitive market forces. The
most pressing problems in the airline regulatory field cluster in
three broad areas: rate making and pricing flexibility, market entry, and anticompetitive agreements.
On October 8, 1975, the Ford administration transmitted to
Congress major legislation, the Aviation Act of 1975 (the Act),
designed to correct the deficiencies in the present system of airline regulation by allowing wider operation of competitive
forces.
The bill would achieve this objective by liberalizing entry,
increasing pricing flexibility, and narrowing the Board's powers
to grant immunity from the antitrust laws.' Only through fundamental changes in the present law with respect to these matters will
the airline industry be able to operate in a workably competitive fashion. Only allowing the industry to operate in this fashion will
the basic defects in its performance be corrected.
In this article I shall discuss the impact of the current system of
regulation on the airline industry's performance. The essential question here is whether airline regulation has encouraged an efficient
allocation of resources responsive to public needs. After dealing
with this issue, I shall discuss the Administration's proposal for regulatory modernization, the Aviation Act of 1975. I will argue that
enactment of this legislation would significantly improve the economic performance of the air transport industry. Finally, I shall
briefly review some of the major arguments which have been
raised in opposition to regulatory modernization.
At the outset let me clearly state where I stand on these questions. I believe that the current system of airline regulation is deficient and that these deficiencies can only be cured by a substantial change in the policies of the Civil Aeronautics Board. I believe
further that the Aviation Act of 1975 provides the correct approach to the problem and its enactment would significantly improve the performance of the airline industry. Finally, I do not believe that the critics of regulatory modernization have an intellectually valid case. The arguments for legislation to liberalize entry,

I The principal entry provisions are sections 4 through 7, and section 9. Agreements are dealt with in section 12, and rates are covered in section 14 of the
Aviation Act of 1975.
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encourage pricing competition, and allow wider scope to the operation of market forces are, in my view, compelling.

I.

THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC
REGULATION

Economic regulation of the airlines by the Civil Aeronautics
Board takes a variety of forms, the most important being control
over entry and pricing! The principal features and characteristics
of the current regulatory system are as follows:
1. The Civil Aeronautics Board has restricted entry into the
airline business. There were sixteen carriers operating when the
1938 Act took effect, and there has not been a single new trunk
line carrier certificated in the Board's history. Through merger,
the sixteen original trunk carriers have shrunk to ten and these
ten now account for ninety percent of the total domestic market.'" As a practical matter, only those firms that participated
in the industry when regulation was established, are now in it.
The Board has, however, certified local service carriers, some
of which are now as large as the smaller trunks, but locals have
not become major competitive forces in the trunks' major markets." Protection of existing carriers is also manifested in the
Board's highly restricted attitude toward the charter carriers. 2
2. The Civil Aeronautics Board by its grant of authority, limits the routes which each carrier may serve. Over the years the
agency has significantly expanded most trunk carriers' route
networks so that on most major routes they have some competition from another trunk carrier (and in some cases from local service carriers). But many smaller trunk carrier markets
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 401, 1002, 49U.S.C. §§ 1371, 1482 (1970).
"0CAB, AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC STATISTICS at 4, 6 (1975) contains data for
twelve months ending June 1975.

" CAB, THE DOMESTIC ROUTE SYSTEM: ANALYSES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 41-43 (1975); G. EADs, THE LOCAL SERVICE AIRLINE EXPERIMENT,
Chs. 4, 5 (1972).
"1Until recently, charter operations were allowed only on a restricted "affinity"
basis, or for inclusive tours which required a minimum of three stops. Retrictiveness toward charters was significantly relaxed by adoption of new rules by the
Board in August 1975. Under the new rule, one-stop inclusive tour charters
(OTC's) are allowed. CAB Docket No. 27135, Regulation SPR-85, Part 378aOne-Stop Inclusive Tour Charters, adopted August 7, 1975.
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are monopolistic and local carriers also serve many monopoly
markets.
3. The Civil Aeronautics Board has seriously restricted pricing
competition among airlines and has set fares with a view predominantly toward protecting the airlines' rate of return. In
concept, the Civil Aeronautics Board attempts to assure a specified rate of return for carriers whose local factors are at
or above a level set by the Board. In practice, the target rate
of return has rarely been earned. Nevertheless, airlines have
been able to attract sufficient capital with which to purchase
aircraft to provide a level of service considerably above the
target load factors.
4. The Civil Aeronautics Board does not put an upper limit
on the amount of service that a carrier may provide on any of
its certificated routes except where such route is covered by
a capacity agreement that is sanctioned by the Board. Neither
does the Board control expenditures on inflight service or other
amenities offered passengers. Thus, while new entry is tightly
controled, carriers have substantial ability to compete through
scheduling and service.
The regulatory environment briefly sketched out above has significantly affected the way the airline industry operates. Its principal impacts are:
A. The airline industry as a whole uses more resources to produce a given level of service (measured in terms of passenger and
ton miles produced) than would be used if fares were set as a result
of competition among airlines rather than by the Board. The excess use of resources takes several forms. Of particular importance,
airline load factors are depressed because airlines compete
through their flight schedules rather than through prices. An inverse relationship exists between fares and break-even load factors. The higher the established fares relative to the competitive
level, the lower the break-even load factor.' High fares encourage
carriers to compete through flight schedules, and as long as fares
are above a break-even load factor level, this service rivalry will
cause average loan factors to fall. Thus an important consequence
"See J. MILLER AND G. DOUGLAS, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC AIR
TRANSPORT: THEORY AND POLICY

40 (1974).
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of the absence of effective price competition is over-scheduling
which produces excess capacity and low load factors.
Airlines have also been encouraged to engage in other forms of
non-price competition. They provide service to travelers which
appear to the travelers to be free. It is doubtful that the same
quantity or quality of such services would be purchased if airlines
charged for them. With price competition inhibited, competition
tends to take a non-price form. Passengers find airlines competing
for their patronage through elaborate cuisine, free drinks, attractive stewardesses, multi-colored planes, piano bars, and of course,
schedule frequency. It is important to recognize, however, that this
non-price competition occurs in markets where airlines are faced
with competition, not in markets where regulation has limited entry so that airlines are monopolists. The sanctioning of capacity
agreements by the Board is certainly a way to lessen some of the
resource waste resulting from the absence of price competition,
but it has more than offsetting deleterious effects.
B. As a result of the emphasis on service competition, excessive
costs are incurred by airlines which are in turn passed on to consumers in the form of fares higher than would be the case if price
competition existed. Because fares are higher as a result of the regulatory process, the quantity of service purchased is reduced. Thus
everyone who flies pays more and some people who might fly at
competitive fares do not fly at the higher fares.
In this regard, it is important to note that few people are enriched by the regulation. In the absence of capacity agreements, airlines compete away the potential gains resulting from the Board's
unwillingness to allow price competition. And even in the presence of capacity agreements, the same tendency exists because relatively few routes are subject to capacity agreements and the airlines
are in a position to switch aircraft to non-agreement routes and intensify competition in these markets.
C. Because the Board prohibits price competition but allows
other forms of competition, airlines tend to provide a non-optimal
mix of service to their customers. Airlines compete with each other
with respect to flight frequency, passenger amenities, terminal facilities and the like. A consumer who wants to fly from A to B is
forced to buy not only his seat but also a set of other services
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which he might not purchase if given the option of a less costly
flight at a lower price. This is not to say that no passengers would
want to buy the meal that is now free, the comfort of a partially
empty airpline, the privilege of the most convenient departure
time, or the pleasure of being served by attractive cabin personnel.
But many passengers would probably prefer a lower cost flight
with fewer amenities, a flight that may be less conveniently scheduled, or that is more completely filled.1" All of the extra services
are costly and cause the airlines to use resources that are valuable
in alternative uses.
The misallocation resulting from the lack of price competition
is sometimes quite visible and extreme. In the middle and late
1950's, airlines ordered replacements for their long-range aircraft
such as the DC6B, and similar models made by Lockheed. The
replacement aircraft were somewhat faster but a great deal more
expensive to operate. Airlines were prohibited from charging a
lower fare for flights on the slower and less costly 6B's than for
the newer turbo-compound equipment. As a result, consumers preferred the latter type of aircraft and switched to them whenever
possible. Not long after the introduction of the turbo-compound
equipment, jets were introduced and the newest piston aircraft
were phased out of service after only a few years' use even though
some older piston aircraft with lower operating costs continued
in use for additional years.
D. In an effort to inhibit non-price competition among airlines,
or indeed to inhibit all forms of competition among airlines, the
Civil Aeronautics Board over the years has established rules which
cause the industry to act inefficiently. Examples are: closed door
restrictions, which prevent carriers from providing service for local
passengers; the long-haul restriction, which requires carriers to fly
beyond their logical terminus; or the mandatory stop requirement,
which prevents the carrier from providing direct non-stop air service between two points. In order to inhibit the growth of substitute
services, the Board has severely limited the operations of charter
carriers and it has also restricted the operation of commuter airlines.' All of these restrictions by the Board tend to cause ineffici14 See W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA 175-77, 200 (1970).
15As to charter carriers, see note 12 supra. Many commuters operate without
certification under authority of the Board's Part 298 exemption, 19 C.F.R. § 298.
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encies in airline operations. They also cause people to fly at higher
costs or accept a less desirable service than would be the case in
a more competitive airline system.
E. It is likely that there has been a diminution or at least a
reorientationof entrepreneurialendeavor. Rather than seeking to
attract customers by offering that combination of services and
prices best meeting their wants, the management of airlines must
inevitably seek to provide a level of services which fits the regulatory climate. This affects the entire structure of the industry and
diverts its management's attention to channels which in competitive industries would be viewed as non-productive.
II.

THE AVIATION ACT OF

1975

The Aviation Act of 1975 is the Ford Administration's response
to the problems associated with the present system of aviation
regulation. The unifying theme of this legislation is the desirability
of placing greater reliance on competitive market forces in the
aviation industry. The major deficiencies associated with the present regulatory system--excess capacity, high air fares, and the
limited range of price service options-all result from the Civil
Aeronautics Board's suppression of normal competitive forces in
the industry. The only corrective is a substitution of competitive
market forces for traditional Civil Aeronautics Board policies towards fares and entry. Thus the heart of the Aviation Act of 1975
lies in the provisions dealing with entry and pricing.
A. Pricing
Increased pricing flexibility is essential to improving the performance of the aviation industry and the Aviation Act of 1975
The statutory basis for the exemption is § 416(c) (1) of the Federal Aviation Act,
which permits the Board to exempt carriers from economic regulation if it finds
that such regulation would be an undue burden on the carrier or class of carriers.
The exemption is limited to carriers using small aircraft. The original maximum
size was 12,500 pounds gross take-off weight, but this limit was amended in 1972
to a maximum of 7,500 pounds carrying capacity or a passenger capacity of 30.
The Board has not encouraged such carriers to obtain certification. In fact, the
Board recently turned down an application for a temporary certificate made by
a Part 298 commuter carrier even though the Board had found that there was
a need for the service sought, that a commuter carrier would provide the best
service on the route, that the applicant was already providing reliable service on
the route, and that failure to issue the temporary certificate might cause the
termination of the service. Application and Petition of Air Midwest, Inc., Docket
28262, CAB Orders No. 74-1-78 and 75-11-53.
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is designed explicitly to obtain this objective. Under the bill, carriers would be given substantially more freedom to increase or
reduce fares free from the fear of suspension. In addition, explicit
time limits will be placed on Civil Aeronautics Board action in
fare cases, and management will be given much greater freedom
to reduce rates without fear that the rate reduction ultimately will
be found unlawful.
The Civil Aeronautics Board's power to suspend or set air fares
is statutory." The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 requires air carriers to file and observe just and reasonable tariffs. If the Board
finds a rate unjust, unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory, unduly
preferential, or unduly prejudicial, it may suspend the tariff. After
investigation, the Board may determine and prescribe a different
fare, or maximum or minimum charges, or both. The statute sets
forth five factors which the Board must consider in determining
the lawfulness of rates.
Under the statute, carriers are free to file fares with the Civil
Aeronautics Board which are different from those of their competitors, and, in theory, this could create considerable pricing competition. As a practical matter, however, there is little real pricing
competition. Airline fares have been generally uniform in all markets of equal distance, regardless of demand conditions, supply,
seasonality, density, or costs.
Carriers who file tariffs reflecting moderate price decreases for
particular types of service have had to answer to competing carriers who have generally complained to the Board that the rate
reduction is unreasonably low. The cost, the uncertainty, and the
delay of Board suspension proceedings has had a chilling effect
upon individual carrier ratemaking initiatives. Because carriers
anticipate the difficulty of obtaining approval, many reductions are
never filed in the first place. Carriers facing rate increases in particular markets face the same problem. Often the Board will suspend and set for investigation such rates on its own initiative.
Again, the cost of the investigation has a chilling effect upon carrier initiative. Carriers usually find it expendient to withdraw the
rate or to await Board approval of a general fare increase.
The Aviation Act of 1975 is designed to increase carrier pricing
16Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 1002, 49 U.S.C. S 1482(g) (1970).
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flexibility by reducing the regulatory hurdles to innovative pricing.
First, it would amend section 1002(d) to provide that a rate
above "direct costs" may not be found unjust or unreasonable on
the basis it is too low.' Direct costs are defined as those costs
which vary directly without output, i.e., to exclude overhead, fixed
costs, and non-variable costs. By limiting the Board's minimum
ratemaking authority in this way, the Act provides for considerable
downward pricing flexibility. The Board's present authority with
respect to the ultimate lawfulness of rate increases is not affected.
Secondly, the Act amends section 1002(g) to create a nosuspend zone.18 Rate increases may be suspended but only if
they exceed ten percent of the rate in effect one year prior to the
proposed change. Rate decreases may be suspended but only if
there is a clear and convincing reason to believe that they do not
cover the direct costs of the service at issue or if the resulting rate
decrease exceeds certain limits. In the first year after enactment,
the Board may not suspend a rate which provides for less than
a twenty percent decrease in the rate in effect on the date of enactment; and in the second year after enactment, the Board may
not suspend a rate which provides for less than a forty percent
decrease in the rate in effect on the date of enactment. Again, this
zone relates only to suspensions, and does not affect the Board's
authority to rule on the ultimate lawfulness of a rate. During the
third and succeeding years the Board could not suspend any proposed rate reduction unless there was reason to believe on the basis
of a preliminary finding that the rate was likely to be below direct
operating costs. The direct operating costs criterion is a protection
against predatory pricing. Moreover, the Federal Act of 1975
amends 1002(e) to place increased emphasis on the need for
price competition as a means of promoting a healthy air transportation industry responsive to the public needs."9 Finally, the
Act provides a time limit for rate cases."0 If the Board has not
completed its proceedings within 180 days of the time the rate was
scheduled to take effect, the tariff goes into effect without further
proceedings.
7

Aviation Act of 1975 § 14(a).
" Id. % 14(c).
9
1d. §5 4, 14(b).
2
Old. 5 14(c).
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The foregoing changes in the Aviation Act will create considerable opportunities for increased pricing flexibility. This flexibility
is a necessary condition to improve the performance of the airline
industry. Problems of excess capacity, high air fares, and the narrow range of price service options are directly related to the absence of effective price competition in the airline industry. In
intrastate markets, such as Texas and California, where entry and
pricing have been less restricted, prices have been considerably
lower than in comparable interstate markets. 1 Similarly, commuter airlines, operating completely free of controls over entry and
price, and using equipment which is more costly per passenger
mile, tend to charge comparable or lower fares than regulated
carriers on flights of similar distance."
The evidence is quite clear that many people would prefer lower
air fares in exchange for the amenities and service levels afforded
today. Many passengers would prefer the opportunity to select
carriers based upon price; some would prefer high load factors,
less frills, and lower fares; others are willing to pay for low load
factor, more comfortable and more costly service. The suppression
of price competition has prevented carriers from responding to
such consumer desires with a variety of prices related to different
quality service.
B. Entry
The Federal Aviation Act grants the Board wide discretion in
determining entry and route awards."2 Under section 401 of the
Federal Aviation Act, the Board is given authority to determine
which carriers may operate in scheduled interstate service and on
which routes they may operate. The applicant must be found fit,
willing and able to perform the service properly and the transportation must be required by public convenience and necessity. The
21Kennedy Hearings at 102, 437, 446, 454, 1150.
22 COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC
AND UNREGULATED AIR FARES

ADVISORS, STAFF STUDY, EVIDENCE

ON REGULATED

(July 15, 1975).

2Section 401(d)(1) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1371
(1970), states that "The Board shall issue a certificate authorizing the whole or
any part of the transportation covered by the applicant, if it finds that the applicant is fit, willing and able to perform such transportation properly and to con-

form to the provisions of this act and the rules, regulations and requirements of
the Board hereunder, and that such transportation is required by the public con-

venience and necessity; otherwise such transportation shall be denied."
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Board has interpreted the entry provisions of the Federal Aviation
Act so as to create artificially high barriers to entry into the industry. Reducing the barriers to entry into the commercial aviation
business is a second essential condition to improving its performance.
Increased pricing flexibility and liberalized entry go hand-inhand. Thus any proposal relating to price must be combined with
one relating to entry into air transportation markets. The two are
indivisible. The present system of blockaded entry reduces the
pressure on existing carriers to engage in price competition. This,
in turn, contributes to the problem of high fares, low load factors,
and excessively high costs. With the number of competitors essentially fixed, maximum fare and minimum quality of service regulation may be necessary. With liberalized entry and pricing, carriers will be under competitive pressure to provide a range of services desired by the public at prices which reflect the actual cost
of producing the service. The threat of potential competition will
police carrier behavior and provide the needed incentive for carriers in existing markets to keep prices at a level low enough to
forestall entry of competitors. The Board has never recognized the
importance of potential competition as a market policing device
and, therefore, the threat of new entry has had at best an attenuated effect upon carrier behavior. Potential competition is a vitally important force in producing desirable market results, i.e., in
assuring that firms are diligent in proving the type of service and
price/quality options that the public desires.
Given the oligopoly character of most major airline markets
and the monopoly characteristics of many local service markets,
relaxation of entry is essential to police the pricing flexibility provisions of the proposed Aviation Act. Pricing flexibility unaccompanied by entry relaxation would create a serious danger of oneway flexibility resulting in higher fares, exacerbation of the overcapacity problem, and an even poorer economic performance by
the airline industry.
The Aviation Act of 1975 is designed to reduce substantially the
barriers facing qualified firms who wish to enter into air transportations, expand into new markets, or offer new varieties of service.
Enactment of the legislation, however, would not necessarily lead
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to the addition of new carriers on each domestic route, nor even to
the addition of new carriers on a majority of the domestic routes.
The basic result would be the introduction of potential competition.
The threat of potential entry will police and discipline market behavior and insure competitive market results. The liberalized entry
will place firms at the edge of the market, able and ready to step
into that market when consumers are dissatisfied with the existing
service and price levels. Such dissatisfaction will attract new entrants, but the existing firms will have an incentive to price competitively and offer the type of price service options which consumers
desire. Certainly there will be occasions when an outsider will come
into the market. This will occur when the new entrant provides a
type of service not available from existing carriers and in instances
in which the new firm is simply more efficient than existing firms.
The more important result, however, will be introduction of potential competition which in turn will produce more competitive results by existing firms. The proposed Act contains a number of provisions designed to reduce gradually but substantially the barriers
to entry into air transportation while providing adequate time for
existing carriers to rationalize their operations and adjust to the
changing economic environment. I will briefly outline the Act's major entry provisions.
1. Policy Changes. The Board's present Declaration of Policy
written some thirty-seven years ago, was framed in the context of an
infant industry in need of protection rather than a mature industry capable of operating in a competitive environment." The
Board has, in the past, relied on its Declaration of Policy to limit
competition.' Accordingly, the Aviation Act of 1975 proposes to
revise this Declaration to stress the desirability of competition and
to deemphasize the protection of established carriers."
2. ProceduralChanges. The Board has often refused to hear applications and to render decisions within a reasonable period of
time. Instead, it has used procedural motions to settle substantive
questions." The Aviation Act of 1975 deals with these matters by
24 Kennedy Hearings at 19, 37, 680.

2 Additional Service to San Diego, CAB Order No. 74-5-17.
2'Aviation Act of 1975 § 4.
27 From 1969 to 1974, the Board enforced a de facto route moratorium, pursuant to which it virtually refused to set for hearing application for new route
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proposing procedural changes which would require the Board to
hear and decide cases speedily.28 To speed the disposition of cases
the Board will be given the option of dismissing any cases it chooses
not to hear. Any cases dismissed, however, shall be dismissed for
cause and will be reviewable by the Court of Appeals-thus ending the practice of denying applications by inaction and leaving
the applicant with no recourse to court review.
3. Supplemental vs. Scheduled Service. For years doubt has existed whether paragraph 401 (d) (3) of the Federal Aviation Act
was intended to prevent supplemental carriers (i.e., charter carriers) from also applying for authority to provide scheduled service." The Board has recently addressed this question and decided
that a supplemental carrier could not hold operating authority as
a scheduled carrier.' Partly as a result of this legal ambiguity, no
supplemental carrier has ever been permitted to undertake scheduled service even though qualified in every other aspect. The Aviation Act of 1975 amends paragraph 401(d) (3) so that supplemental air carriers will be allowed to apply for authority to provide
scheduled service. 1
4. Charter Service. In the past, the Board has generally placed
such strict limitations on charter services that its growth has been
severely impaired." For example, prior to August 7, 1975, the only
inclusive tour charter rule in effect contained a number of highly
restrictive conditions. These conditions included: (1) the number
of days required between departure and return; (2) overnight
hotel accommodations at a minimum of three places, other than
the point of origin, no less than fifty air miles from each other;
authority and generally denied applications for new competitive authority in cases
already in progress. Kennedy Hearings at 540, 546, 553, 576, 582, 634, 674, 689,

696, 729, 730. Mr. Minetti, a member of the Board, testified that the Board's
policy was not one of route moratorium. He also indicated, however, that in

1969, after several new routes had been granted, the carriers suggested a moratorium to have an opportunity to "digest the new routes they had received" and
that the Board subsequently adopted a "policy of caution" in granting new routes.

Kennedy Hearings at 652-53.
28Aviation Act of 1975 § 5.
29Application of World Airways for a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity, CAB Order No. 76-1-88 (1976).
30 Id.

"' Aviation Act of 1975 § 6(a).
"2See note 12 supra.
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and (3) a tour price which was not less than 110 percent of any
available scheduled fare. The price of an inclusive tour was not
based on the cost of the specific charter flight and the related
ground accommodations, but on the price of an unrelated scheduled fare. This condition, taken in conjunction with the three stop
requirement, severely limited the saleability of inclusive tour charter services.
Legislation presently before Congress (Senate Bill 421 and
House Resolution 6625) would substantially broaden the availabililty of charter services. In response to this legislation and substantial public criticism, the Board has recently expanded charter
availability on its own initiative.' The Aviation Act of 1975 incorporates the essential features of S. 421 in order to guarantee the
continued availability of charter services which are not unduly restricted.' The liberalizing of charter rules is important for two
reasons. First, there is no good economic reason to inhibit the provision of service which people are willing to buy and which can
profitably be provided. Secondly, and even more important, the
availability of charters as a viable alternative to travelers will provide a competitive check on the prices charged by airlines.
5. Unserved Markets. Under present law, a Board finding of
public convenience and necessity is required even though the applicant is otherwise fit, willing and able to serve a particular market
and service is not being provided by established firms. When qualified firms are prevented from offering service which established
firms are not willing to provide, no useful function is served-not
even the dubious function of protecting existing firms except insofar as their less desirable, round-about or indirect service may be
protected. The Aviation Act of 1975 deals with this problem by
requiring the Board to grant approval for qualified applicants
wishing to provide non-stop service between points not receiving
such service from certified carriers.'
6. Liberalized Exemptions. In 1952 the Board exempted operators of small aircraft from the detailed economic regulation administered by the Board." The original aircraft limitation, 12,500
33 Id.
4

" Aviation Act of 1975 § 2.
Id. at § 6(b).
See note 15 supra.
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pounds, was set at approximately half the weight of a DC-3-then
the equipment operated by the Nation's major airlines. So long as
they operated aircraft smaller than 12,500 pounds (approximately
nineteen seats), commuter air carriers (also called scheduled air
taxis or third level air carriers) were free to charge whatever price
they wished to set and to operate where and when they chose."
In 1972 the Board increased the exemption to thirty passengers or
7500 pounds of payload. 8
The Aviation Act of 1975 liberalizes the exemption for commuter carriers by allowing them to increase the size of aircraft operated from thirty seats to fifty-five seats.' This provision will enable commuter carriers to purchase larger turbo-prop pressurized
aircraft and should materially expand their scope of operations.
These carriers will thus be able to improve service to small points
not attractive to certified carriers.
While the foregoing changes will create a more efficient, adaptive, and responsive air system, we do not expect them to have a
major impact on scheduled service in the principal city-pair markets where the bulk of air passengers are carried. The three
provisions which I will discuss next are designed gradually but substantially to increase the extent of competition in major markets.
7. Certificate Restrictions. Over a period of years, the Board
has attached numerous types of conditions and restrictions to the
operating certificates held by air carriers. Viewed as a comprehensive whole, the primary effect of these restrictions is to protect the
markets of established carriers by preventing other carriers from
offering services they would like to provide. These operating restrictions have a particularly pernicious effect: they increase the
operating costs (and/or decrease revenues) of the restricted carrier. Consequently they permit the restricted carrier's competitors
either to increase costs or become poor marketers, or to earn monopoly profits. An example may make this clear. Suppose airlines
X & Y compete in the A to B markets, but Y is required to fly to
C whenever it serves A & B. Such a requirement can only serve a
37 14 C.F.R. 5 298.11 (1975).
38CAB Order No. 72-7-61,

aff'd sub nom. Hughes Air Corp. v. CAB, 492

F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
39 Aviation Act of 1975 § 6(b).
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purpose if it adversely affects Y's ability to compete with X over
A B. As a result, X, though theoretically subject to Y's competition, would in fact be able to take advantage of Y's handicap in
deciding on the level or type of service it offers. The Aviation Act
of 1975 directs the Board to undertake a proceeding to eliminate
all existing certificate restrictions within a five year period and
specifically prohibits the Board from imposing any closed-door,
single-plane service, mandatory stop, long-haul, or any other similar restrictions." In phasing out existing restrictions, the Board will
be directed to proceed carefully with an eye toward the effects on
the carriers and the traveling public. The phasing of the restriction
removal program is dictated by the desire to provide all existing
carriers with adequate opportunity to increase their efficiency and
adjust their operations to the requirements of a more competitive
environment.
8. Sale of Certificates. The Aviation Act of 1975 provides that,
after January 1, 1978, a carrier may sell, transfer, or lease any
portion of its operating authority to another carrier so long as the
purchaser is fit, willing and able to undertake the transportation
and so long as the transfer does not diminish competition."' This
provision will enable carriers to rationalize their operating systems
by the purchase and sale of operating authority. In effect, this provision provides an alternative to the normal public convenience and
necessity entry route for qualified air carriers.
The pattern of routes currently served by most carriers reflect
the erratic manner in which the Board has dispensed route awards
and also the manner in which the original certificates were awarded, which had little to do with the then (1930's) existing airline
economics. With new markets opened to service infrequently and
sporadically, many carriers have felt compelled to apply for permission to provide service in numerous markets in the hope that
they would receive authority to serve at least a few of them.
The Board has not always awarded routes to the carrier which
would be most likely to enter and succeed under competitive conditions. Sometimes in seeking "balance" the CAB has made a
route award to a carrier whose system was meant to be strength40
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ened by the award even though it might be a less effective competitor than another applicant. The resulting system of routes operated
by many carriers is not conducive to efficient operations.
The proposed provision provides carrier management with the
opportunity to improve their route network. This provision also
provides an additional way for new firms to enter the business of
scheduled air transportation. Any firm found to be fit, willing and
able to provide air service by the Board may purchase route authority from an established carrier. In particular, this may be expected to help the supplemental air carriers who have for years
sought to provide scheduled service. This provision will open
markets for new firms and permit existing firms to rationalize their
own systems. Since the transfer of operating authority will result
in one carrier authorization being substituted for another, it will
not increase the number of carriers authorized in any market unless an existing certificate holder is not using his route authority.
It has sometimes been argued that operating authorities should
not be saleable because they are grants by government. This argument is a non-sequitur. Also it is in the public's interest that a
monopoly, if granted, be used by the firm that will use it to serve
best. If the right to purchase does not provide means of enhancing
monopoly, and in this case it clearly does not because the government can always issue new certificates, then the one who values
it most highly will also provide the best service. As a practical
matter, I believe that certificates will not have significant values
because the new grants of route authorities will, within a few years,
be so widespread as to make route certificates valueless except for
the goodwill that may occur to a carrier providing service.
9. Discretionary Mileage. To ensure a fully efficient air system,
some measure of flexibility and entry will be needed in the long
term in addition to that provided by the removal of current certificate restrictions. The final provision of the Aviation Act of 1975
dealing with entry is aimed at providing this flexibility over the
longer term."
Following the completion of the certificate restriction removal
program, the Aviation Act of 1975 will allow each carrier to provide a limited amount of scheduled service in addition to those
42 Aviation
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services specified in its operating certificate.'a Carriers could use
this authority for a gradual expansion and rationalization of their
route systems. The expansion process will be gradual since the total
amount of new authority created each year would be limited to
approximately five percent of system operations. Following a period of satisfactory service in markets entered under the discretionary mileage rule, the points served could be added automatically
to the carrier's operating certificate without cumbersome procedures.
The entry provisions of the bill serve a number of important
objectives:
a. Allow the development of low cost air service tailored to the
needs of the market.
b. Eliminate waste and inefficiencies associated with past CAB
certification practices.
c. Allow the threat of potential entry to police the pricing flexibility provisions of the Act.
d. Insure competitive market behavior under which an appropriate mix of price/service options will be offered to the flying
public.
Taken together with the pricing flexibility provisions of the Act,
the entry provisions will allow competitive forces in the airline industry to set fares, determine service patterns, and police market
behavior. In short, the Aviation Act's entry and pricing provisions
will substitute the market place for the Civil Aeronautics Board's
judgment on crucial issues of air fares and service levels.
C. Anticompetitive Agreements
A third broad area of present regulatory policy affected by the
Aviation Act of 1975 is the Civil Aeronautics Board's grant of
antitrust immunity to carrier agreements." The Federal Aviation
Act presently provides that all agreements among air carriers must
be filed with the Board and that the Board must either approve
or disapprove such agreements.' Once Board approval is given,
agreements are immune to challenge under the antitrust laws. Most
of the agreements filed with the Board are indisputably innocuous
4
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and do not raise serious antitrust considerations. Nevertheless,
some agreements, particularly agreements to restrict capacity, do
have serious anticompetitive effects. The uneconomic and anticompetitive effects of such agreements are striking.
Capacity agreements reduce the principal form of competition
in the airline industry-service competition through scheduling frequency. Because price competition is so heavily restricted by Board
policy, the anticompetitive effect of such agreements is all the more
harsh. Another result is lower quality service than that implied
by the fare level.
By apportioning market shares among competing carriers, agreements substitute non-market forces for market forces which would
produce a competitive and more economically sound result.
Agreements mask chronic problems of excess capacity. Because
price competition is eliminated by uniformly set fares, service competition, most notably in the form of scheduling frequency, is all
that remains. Frequent service means low load factors, substantial
unused capacity, and high fares. By substituting artificial arrangements for market forces in reducing the unused capacity, the agreements neither allow lower fares nor, through attrition and reduced
investment over time, do they result in a reduction in the number
of available seats in the system.
Capacity agreements also affect carriers in the nonagreement
markets. Since they apply only to certain markets, carriers divert
otherwise idle planes to markets served by nonagreement carriers
and spill excess capacity over into those markets. This distorts the
decision-making process for allocation of equipment between markets.
Finally, capacity agreements reduce incentives for rational investment planning. Absent capacity reduction agreements, competitive market forces would reduce capacity by discouraging overinvestment and accelerating sale of surplus equipment. Because
carriers can expect Board-sanctioned protection if they misjudge
investment or disposal decisions, managements are less prudent in
their initial decisions. With Board rescue available, usual disincentives to uneconomic decision-making do not operate.
Capacity agreements, therefore, perpetuate the very problem they
were designed to solve and, by sheltering carriers from competitive
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pressures, they undermine market forces, artificially inflate profits
and fares, and discourage rational economic planning.
The proposed Aviation Act addresses the problem of antitrust
immunity for fundamentally anticompetitive agreements by prohibiting pooling, capacity, price fixing, and other anticompetitive
agreements while retaining the authority of the Board to approve
agreements which are not fundamentally anticompetitive, such as
agreements dealing with ticketing, baggage handling, equipment
interchanges, and the like.
The bill provides for a new standard to be applied to businesstype agreements which are not anticompetitive in character or are
otherwise essential to the functioning of a sound transportation system. Under the new standard, the Board may not approve an agreement which adversely affects competition unless clear and convincing evidence exists that the agreement is necessary "to meet a
serious transportation need or to secure important public benefits,
and no less anticompetitive alternative is available to reach the
same result." Thus agreements which serve valid transportation
needs without serious anticompetitive risks could continue to be
approved by the Board. We would anticipate no difficulty in obtaining approval of desirable business agreements such as interline
traffic agreements, scheduling agreements at congested airports,
equipment interchanges, reservation and ticketing arrangements,
and technical assistance to foreign air carriers. Hundreds of such
agreements are on file with the Board and, standing alone, they
serve beneficial purposes with negligible anticompetitive risk. Because they might arguably be subject to antitrust challenge, we believe that retention of antitrust immunity for them is desirable.
D. Air CarrierMergers
The present section 408(b) of the Federal Aviation Act provides that all mergers and other restructurings must be approved
by the Board under a "public interest" test." The Board's decision
can then be reviewed in the court of appeals on a substantial evidence test in accordance with general review procedures. The
amendment will retain the present section 408(b) for a period of
thirty months after enactment of this bill with respect to any cases
4 Id.
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filed at the Board in that period." Thirty months following enactment a new two-part procedure and a new substantive test will
become effective.
The Act provides, in place of the "public interest" test, that all
restructurings be judged initially by a standard similar to that used
in the Clayton Act. Unlike the Clayton Act, however, there will
be a weighing of the anticompetitive effects against the transportation convenience and needs of the communities. Specifically, the
amendment provides that a restructuring may not be approved if
it will result in a monopoly in any part of the United States or if its
effect is any part of the country may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly, unless the Board finds the
anticompetitive effects are outweighed by the transportation convenience and needs of the communities and such needs may not be
met in a less anticompetitive manner.
This test will first be administered by the Board, as in the present
procedure. The Attorney General, however, will have the option
of seeking the review of the Board's decision either in the U. S.
Circuit Court of Appeals on a "substantial evidence test" or in the
U. S. Federal District Court on a de-novo basis. The Attorney
General will indicate within a certain time which method of appeal
he chooses. The Attorney General could not seek review in the
Court of Appeals if an antitrust action were pending in the District
Court.
If review were sought in the District Court, the amendment provides that the Secretary of Transportation must submit his written
views directly to the court regarding the transportation aspects of
the case. The Board may also intervene in the District Court proceedings to present its views. A merger may not be consummated
before the Board acts and any judicial review is completed. Appeals
from the District Court's decision could be taken directly to the
Supreme Court under the Expediting Act as is the case with actions under the antitrust laws. Finally, this section will also provide that any merger case must be decided by the Board within one
year of the date it was filed.
E. Abandonments
The Aviation Act of 1975 provides for a new abandonment pro47

Aviation Act of 1975 § 11.

1975]

AVIATION REGULATION

cedure." At present, carriers are free to provide various levels of
service, and may substantially reduce service without Board permission. To abandon service completely, however, the carrier must
obtain approval from the Board in accordance with section 401 (j)
of the present act. Abandonment of service has not been a substantial problem in the airline industry, but by this amendment carriers would be assured that they would not be required to provide
non-compensatory service.
The section would amend section 401(j) and provide that a
carrier may abandon a route if:
1. the carrier has operated the route below fully allocated cost
(including a reasonable return) for at least one year, except
the Board may postpone the abandonment for up to one year;
2. the carrier has operated the route below direct costs for a
period of at least three months-in this case there is no postponement; or
3. upon ninety days' notice if the carrier can demonstrate that
service will be provided by another carier.
An exception to the above occurs if a community or another public body agrees to provide sufficient payments to a carrier to ensure
that carriers' revenues (including any subsidy) at least equal its
fully allocated costs, including a reasoable return. In this case, the
carrier may not abandon the route as long as the payments are
made. Thus, continuation of service is left to the option of the
affected community. This revised abandonment provision will not
result in the loss of service at cities where federally subsidized service is provided by local service carriers since losses are made up
by the federal government.
By providing opportunities for carriers to get out of unprofitable
markets, the abandonment provision is a means to alleviate any
internal cross-subsidies which may exist and to prevent internal
cross-subsidies from becoming a major problem. We do not anticipate that the new provision will lead to a substantial increase in
abandonments, but it is important that an appropriate abandonment
standard exist, both to avoid internal cross-subsidy and to allow
market adjustments to assure that a proper incentive exists to tailor
air service to market demands. Carriers should not be forced to lose
"Id. at S 8.
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money or operate on the basis that profitable routes subsidized
those producing inadequate revenue.
F. The Arguments Against Regulatory Modernization
A number of arguments have been raised in opposition to regulatory modernization in general, and to the Aviation Act of 1975
in particular. Space limitations will not permit me to do more than
discuss these arguments in a highly abbreviated form. The arguments cluster under essentially four broad subjects.
1. Enactment of the legislation will result in a severe reduction
in service, primarily to small communities.
2. Regulatory modernization will create undesirably harsh competitive conditions, resulting in "cut-throat competition," and
severe financial hardship for the airlines.
3. A closely related argument is that regulatory modernization
will significantly increase the prospects of monopoly in the
aviation industry.
4. The system works well and there is no need for reform.
1. Service to Small Communities
The federal subsidy to regional airlines is intended to provide
for service to communities which generate so little airline traffic that
the service is not self-supporting. The Aviation Act of 1975 does
not change this subsidy program. Consequently, there should be no
diminution in service to communities now receiving subsidized
service.
The Civil Aeronautics Board has generally granted abandonment
applications by trunk carriers if the airline has shown the service
to be unprofitable. But some communities receive non-subsidized
service from trunk airlines but generate insufficient traffic to defray
the cost of this service. In part, trunk airlines provide the service
because many travelers from these communities travel beyond the
nearest hub on the airline's longhaul routes. To the extent that service is provided because the combination of feeder and longhaul
service is profitable, there is no reason to believe that the Act will
diminish airlines' incentive to provide non-subsidized feeder service
since there will be no diminution in airline profitability.
It may be that some airlines provide unprofitable service to a
few small communities because they believe it is politically prudent
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to do so. The abandoment provisions of the Act will enable them
to discontinue this service if they so desire. The argument that the
Aviation Act of 1975 will cause substantial loss of service to small
communities ultimately depends upon the existence of substantial
cross-subsidy between aviation markets. Only if certain markets
are generating excess profits will it be possible for firms to subsidize
losses in other markets and still make a normal rate of return. There
is not any theoretical or empirical evidence showing the existence
of cross-subsidy for the trunkline carriers. As I have indicated
above, service competition operates to eliminate excess profits on
markets where rates are set above a breakeven load factor. Only
when rates are set above a breakeven load factor in monopoly
markets would we expect to see firms earning excess profits in those
markets. This is the case in some markets served by regional carriers. Thus there may be some internal cross-subsidy in markets
served by regional carriers but service in these markets is not jeopardized by the bill because the present subsidy program is not altered. The Air Transport Association submitted a study on this issue
to the Administrative Practice and Procedure subcommittee in connection with that Committee's recent hearings on the aviation
industry. The ATA study concluded that deregulation of the scheduled air transportation system would lead to a wholesale reduction
in air service. This study is deficient for a number of reasons and
its conclusions are not supported.'s For our purposes here, suffice
it to say that the ATA model assumes that each market is served
by a single monopolist. It stimulates the behavior of an industry
made up of monopoly carriers rather than an industry with a number of firms operating in a competitive environment. Under the
ATA model, the industry would operate with extremely high load
factors and extraordinarily high level of earnings-a situation
which is vastly at odds with the competitive environment which the
Aviation Act would produce. By simulating a monopoly, the model
produces spurious results. The model fails to take into account such
factors as the role of feeder traffic which provides support for
longer haul flights and the role of plane positioning."
41For a devastating critique of the ATA study, see forthcoming report of the
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Scheduled commuter airlines provide substitute or competitive
services to those provided by local service or trunk airlines to small
communities. Approximately thirty percent of American communities now receiving scheduled air service receive such service solely
from commuter air carriers. These communities tend to be smaller
cities with relatively low levels of traffic, in many cases less than
twenty-five passengers a day. If local service or trunk air carriers
were to discontinue service to some communities because it is unprofitable, then commuter airlines, which operate equipment that
is far more economical than that used by certificated airlines, will
step in to fill the void: they have done so in the past and I expect
they will continue to do so.
Due to the increased competition and pressure for lower air fares,
service in many smaller markets is likely to increase because the
level of demand will rise. The Texas and California experience
indicates that where price competition has been allowed to exist,
the result has been a substantial increase in the quantity of air service provided and used. In summary, I believe there will not be
much abandonment because the subsidy to local carriers is continued, trunks have already been permitted to abandon unprofitable
services, and low-cost commuter service has been and will continue
to be an available alternative.
2. Cut-throat Competition
It is correct that the Aviation Act will increase competition with
respect to rates but, as I have explained earlier in this paper, the
airline industry does not suffer from a lack of service competition.
There is no reason to believe the substitution of price competition
for service competition will in itself lead to ruinous conditions in
the industry, i.e., a condition under which rates are chronically
below fully allocated costs. It will lead to some restructuring of
service patterns and it will rechannel the competitive efforts of airlines but will not alter their intensity.
To the extent that the added price competition will lead airlines
to operate with fuller aircraft, some aircraft may be grounded. This
service will be dropped between Chicago and St. Louis, a market with over 1200
daily passengers. It also predicts that service will be dropped between New York

and Baltimore, with over 600 passengers per day, and in the Dallas-Houston market with over 1,000 passengers a day.
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is by no means certain, however, because the lower air fares may
stimulate demand sufficiently to more than offset the effect of the
higher load factors. To avoid any undue financial hardship, the
entry and pricing provisions of the bill are phased over a long
period. The pricing flexibility is phased in over three years and
entry in stages over a much longer period. This is done in order to
allow normal growth in the demand for air travel to absorb any
excess equipment that might result from the fact that consumers
will choose to fly fuller aircraft at lower fares.
In any event, there is no justification for the ruinous competition
argument in the economic structure in the airline industry." The
evidence suggests very strongly that the optimal size of firms will
be sufficiently small so that there will be room for a considerable
number of competitive firms in the industry." There are no significant scale economies in the industry and all of the presently certificated carriers appear to be larger than the minimum efficient size
firm.
Since predatory competition entails certain short-term losses, a
rational firm would engage in such conduct only when there existed
a strong prospect of obtaining monopoly profits either by driving
other firms from the market or by disciplining the market. Two
conditions are essential for predatory pricing.' One, the predator
firm must have superior resources which give it greater staying
power to achieve the purpose of driving the rivals out of the market, and two, there must be high barriers to entry to enable the
predator firm to recoup its losses. In other words, the prospect of
eventually realizing monopoly profits from the predatory conduct
must be good. When entry or re-entry can occur relatively easily
whenever prices return to levels at or above cost, the incentive to
engage in such behavior is eliminated. By reducing the barriers to
entry, the Aviation Act of 1975 will also reduce the prospect of
successful predation.
The experience of the California and Texas intrastate carriers
certainly suggests that price competition in the airline industry does

"ISee Testimony and Exhibits of the Dept. of Transportation, Phase 7, DPFI
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not have destructive results. The underlying economic characteristics of the industry along with the reduction in the barriers to entry
resulting from the Aviation Act indicates that predatory pricing
does not pose a serious problem in the airline industry. In addition,
the Aviation Act of 1975 itself will prohibit rates below variable
cost and, of course, remedies under the antitrust statutes or section
411 of the Federal Aviation Act which prohibits unfair competition will continue to apply.
3. The Prospect of Monopoly
Regulation has not increased the number of firms above the
number that would exist under a less regulated environment. Indeed, the contrary is correct. Since there are not any significant economies of scale in the industry, one would not expect any natural
tendencies towards monopoly. The entry restrictions have reduced
the number of firms below the number that would otherwise be
effective competitors. Consequently, there is no threat of natural
monopoly in the industry and the application of antitrust principles
will ensure that the industry becomes and remains competitive.
4. The System Works, There is No Need For Reform
This argument is no more valid than an argument that a sixcylinder automobile running on four-cylinders is running and should
not be repaired. As I have discussed earlier in this paper, the system is not functioning as well as it should function and can be
made to function more effectively. The proposed Aviation Act's
purpose is to bring about improvements in the economic performance of the airline industry.

